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THE U.S. economic  expansion  of the 1980s  is frequently  compared  with 
that  of the 1960s,  with  the similarities  extending  to inflation  and  the labor 
market.  For example, during  both the 1980s  and the 1960s  inflation  was 
lower than predicted, and during both decades low rates of wage 
increases  contributed  to the surprisingly  low inflation  rates. After 1969, 
however, the core rate of inflation  trended higher, with wage gains 
leading  the way, even in the midst  of the impending  recession.  I 
Unions have long been considered  inflation's  wild card. They helped 
lower inflation  during  the 1960s  and 1980s,  but played the opposite role 
during  the stagflation  of the 1970s.2  The question  that  we address  in this 
paper  is whether  unions  are more  likely to be a positive or negative  wild 
card  over the next few years. 
After  a brief  review of the data  on recent wage increases, we narrow 
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1. It was the shift  in wage behavior  in 1970  that led George  Perry  to argue  that  wage 
norms  and  largely  nonlinear  shifts  in those norms  played  a significant  role in the inflation 
process.  Perry  (1980,  1983). 
2. See Eckstein  and  Wilson  (1962)  for a discussion  of the 1950s  and 1960s.  For a later 
study analyzing  the variation  in union-nonunion  wages, see Perry (1967). In Daniel 
Mitchell's  view, wage  norms  are  present  only  in union  wage  behavior;  see Mitchell  (1985). 
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our  focus to the union  wage premium.  Because there  are  no government 
data  on wage  premiums  and  because there  is no way even to track  union 
and  nonunion  relative  wage increases  before 1976,  we first  construct  and 
evaluate  relative  wage  and  wage  premium  measures.  What  the data  show 
is that the union premium  follows a pattern,  with long periods of year- 
to-year increases followed by long periods of year-to-year  declines. 
During much of the  1960s and 1980s, union wage moderation was 
reflected in consistent annual decreases in the premium. During the 
1950s  and 1970s, by contrast, the premium  showed a trend of annual 
increases. In this paper,  we use the term "wage norm  shift" to refer  to 
these global changes in the direction of the premium.3  An important 
question  that  we seek to answer  is whether  the 1980s  norm  of declining 
premiums  is about to shift. We believe that a historically  low premium 
today would increase the likelihood of a norm shift in the near term, 
hence  increasing  wage  pressure  on inflation  rates.  The  evidence, though, 
is that  union  premiums  remain  high  enough  to preclude  a norm  shift. 
We next turn  to the broader  issue of changes  in the health  of the union 
sector, including  the degree of management  acceptance of unions. We 
analyze union employment shares, strike activity, allegations of em- 
ployer  unfair  labor  practices  and  decertification  elections, and  evidence 
of any changes  in the direction  of labor  law. Significant  changes  in these 
variables  are likely to precede wage norm shifts. Again, the evidence 
suggests  continued  union  wage moderation. 
Using our newly constructed union and nonunion  wage series, we 
then present a more traditional  analysis of the short-term  outlook for 
wages.  The  regression  equations  we estimate  are  modeled  after  aggregate 
equations  developed by George Perry  and Robert  Gordon.  Because of 
data limitations, we do not attempt to explain how wage norms are 
determined.  The institutional  variables  that  are likely to be important  in 
capturing  shifts in union norms are not available  in a form that can be 
used in wage change  equations.  The equations,  however, can be used to 
project  future union and nonunion  wage behavior  as long as the norm 
does not change-as  our  analysis  concludes it will not. 
3. Wage norms are typically defined in terms of a nominal  wage series, whether 
aggregate  or sector-specific.  Defining  the norm  as a characteristic  of the wage premium 
series  is thus  a different  use of the term.  However,  as we shall  show, shifts  in the premium 
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Aggregate, Union, and Nonunion Wage Increases 
In  the past  few years  wage and  compensation  measures,  although  still 
rising slowly by standards  of the 1970s, have begun to accelerate. As 
table I shows, between 1980-81  and 1986,  the rate  of growth  of aggregate 
employment cost  index (ECI) compensation trended lower, with a 
cyclical low of 3.2 percent  in 1986.  As of the second quarter  of 1989,  the 
annual  change stood at 4.5 percent.4  The change in ECI wages mirrors 
that of compensation.  From a high of 9.0 percent in 1980, the rate-of- 
change series reached  a low of 3.1 percent  in 1986.  It has now reached 
4.1 percent. 
The percent  change  in the average  hourly  earnings  index (HEI)  gives 
a less inflationary  reading  of labor  market  pressures.  This  series not only 
troughed  at a lower level than  did  the change  in ECI  wages, falling  to 2.4 
percent in 1986,  but it has also been running  well below the ECI wage 
change  series since 1983.  As of the fourth  quarter  of 1988,  the HEI index 
increase  was up, but  only to 3.4 percent,  0.7 percentage  point  below ECI 
wage increases. 
The discrepancy between the two is large enough to require an 
explanation.  The HEI and ECI series differ  in three respects. First, the 
ECI controls for compositional shifts across two-digit industries and 
three-digit  occupations  (within  firms  and  then  aggregated  at the one-digit 
level), while  the HEI index  controls  only for industry  shifts. Second, the 
HEI excludes  nonproduction  workers  in the goods-producing  industries 
and nonsupervisors  in the service-producing  sectors, populations  that 
are included  in the ECI. Third,  the HEI sample is much  larger  than the 
ECI sample. 
Acknowledging  the gap between the two series, the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics  (BLS) has published  an ECI series based on the HEI worker 
population-that is, production  and nonsupervisory  workers. The new 
series,  designated  ECI-HEI  and  shown  in the fourth  column  of the table, 
is considerably  closer to the broader  ECI than to the HEI, suggesting 
4. The ECI wage is currently  a better  measure  of underlying  labor  market  pressures 
than  is ECI  compensation.  In particular,  compensation  has been pushed  higher  by factors 
largely  irrelevant  to labor  market  conditions  such  as higher  OASDI  tax  rates  and  oversized 
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that the major  difference  between the HEI and the broader  ECI comes 
more from the method of adapting  for compositional  shifts than from 
differences in sample definitions. On this basis, we conclude that the 
ECI  wage's 4.1 percent  rate  of increase  is a more  accurate  reading  of the 
rate of economywide  wage change than is the HEI index's 3.4 percent 
rate. 
The primary  source of wage moderation  during  the 1980s  has been 
the union  sector. Union wage changes  represented  by the BLS series on 
effective wage adjustments  in major collective bargaining  contracts 
(major agreements)  are shown in the final column of table 1. Major 
agreements  wage gains were 2.8 percent in the second quarter  of 1989, 
much lower than the 4.1 percent rate for ECI wages, and only barely 
above the 2.6 rate  for all of 1988. 
Union wage data, however, can yield different  answers  depending  on 
the precise question  asked. The 2.8 percent  rate  in the second quarter  of 
1989 is a backward-looking  number in that it includes increases in 
Table 1.  Indexes of Wage and Compensation Growth,  1980-89a 
Percent change 
Employment cost  index- 
private  Hourly 
Wages and  earnings  ECI-HEI  Union wage 
Year  Compensation  salaries  index  basisb  adjustmentc 
1980:4  9.8  9.0  9.6  9.4  9.9 
1981:4  9.8  8.8  8.3  9.0  9.5 
1982:4  6.4  6.3  6.1  6.2  6.8 
1983:4  5.7  5.0  4.0  4.9  4.0 
1984:4  4.9  4.1  2.9  3.9  3.7 
1985:4  3.9  4.1  3.1  4.0  3.3 
1986:4  3.2  3.1  2.4  2.7  2.3 
1987:4  3.3  3.3  2.6  3.3  3.1 
1988:4  4.9  4.1  3.4  4.2  2.6 
1989:1  4.6  4.2  n.a.  4.6  2.7 
1989:2  4.5  4.1  n.a.  4.1  2.8 
Sources: EC! data  from  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1989b).  HEI from  BLS data.  Wage  adjustment  data  for 1980- 
88 from Current Wage Developments,  March  1989, table  1; for  1989, from Monthly Labor Reviewv, October  1989, 
table  28. 
n.a. Not available.  The hourly  earnings  index  is no longer  published  by the BLS. 
a. All values measure  the change  in a given quarter  from  four quarters  earlier,  except for wage adjustments  for 
1980-88,  which  measure  average  annual  changes. 
b. The ECI  for production  and nonsupervisory  workers. 
c. Total  effective  wage adjustments  prorated  across  all workers  under  contracts  covering  1,000  or more  workers. 
Excludes  lump-sum  and profit-sharing  payments,  overtime,  and nonwage  benefits. Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  237 
contracts negotiated in 1988, 1987, and even 1986. Settlement data, 
which are forward  looking, show a higher rate of wage change and a 
more marked  acceleration. As shown in table 2, over-life-of-contract 
increases have moved from an average of 2.1 percent in 1987 to 3.3 
percent in 1989:2.  Moreover, because settlement data do not include 
contingent  payments  such  as cost-of-living  adjustments  (COLAs),  actual 
increases  in the most recent  settlements  will be greater  than  3.3 percent. 
For contracts  without  COLA clauses (not a random  sample  of all BLS 
covered  contracts),  the rate  of increase  is now 3.4 percent. 
Still another  piece of evidence that union wage increases are accel- 
erating  is the decline in the number  of contracts  with bonuses. Bonuses 
have primarily  been used in contracts  with wage cuts or very low wage 
increases. In 1987, 52 percent of workers with newly signed contracts 
received bonuses. In 1988  the share of workers  receiving  bonuses was 
down to 28 percent. As of the first half of 1989, only 25 percent had 
bonuses .5 
For a final look at union wage trends, we decompose collective 
bargaining  contracts  into three categories:  those with wage increases, 
those with  no change,  and  those with  wage decreases. As shown  in table 
3, the share  of workers  in the major  agreement  sample  who are taking 
Table 2.  Wage Trends in Current Settlementsa 
Percent change 
Chanige  from 
Change from four  quarters earlier  last quarterb 
Type of contract  1987.4  1988:4  1989:1  1989:2  1989:1  1989:2 
All contracts 
Over-life-of- 
contract  2.1  2.4  2.5  2.9  3.1  3.3 
First-year  2.5  2.5  2.7  3.2  3.2  3g9c 
Contracts  without 
COLA  clauses over 
life of contract  2.5  2.8  2.9  3.2  3.2  3.4 
Source:  Cuirrent  Wage Developments,  September  1989, tables  17 and  18. 
a.  The  data  are  wage  adjustments  for  contracts  signed  during each  quarter. They  differ from  the  union  wage 
adjustment series  in table  1, which  shows  adjustments  across  all workers for contracts  then in effect.  The data are 
contractual wage increases  without any contingent  payments  such as COLA  clauses. 
b.  At annual rates. 
c.  First-year increases  for  1989:2 include the restoration of the wage reductions  in major steel  contracts. 
5. Bonuses are classified  by the BLS as compensation  rather  than wages. There is 
some  evidence  that  lump-sum  payments  may  continue,  taking  on aspects  of profit-sharing. 
See Bell and  Neumark  (1989). 238  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Table 3.  Contract Settlement Data: Effective Wage Adjustments, 1981-88a 
Percent 
New  con- 
tracts 
Contracts  with 
with no  Contracts  with wage  wage  de- 
All con-  Contracts  with wage  change  decrease  creaseb 
tracts  increase 
Percent  Percent  Percent 
Wage  Wage  Percent  of  of con-  Wage  of con-  of con- 
Year  change  change  contracts  tracts  change  tracts  tracts 
1981  9.5  9.9  97.1  1.6  -  13.3  1.3  1.3 
1982  6.8  7.2  93.9  5.8  -  7.2  0.3  0.3 
1983  3.9  5.7  78.3  15.4  -  7.7  6.3  6.1 
1984  3.7  4.7  82.6  15.3  -  7.4  2.1  1.7 
1985  3.3  4.2  79.3  19.5  -  2.5  1.2  1.0 
1986  2.3  3.4  78.5  17.7  -  7.9  3.8  3.5 
1987  3.1  3.8  83.4  15.1  -  7.9  1.5  1.3 
1988  2.6  3.4  77.7  21.2  -4.4  1.0  0.5 
Source:  BLS  data supplied by Harriet Weinstein. 
a.  Effective  wage adjustments do not include lump-sum payments or profit-sharing payments.  Adjustments in shift 
differentials are included,  with the exception  of overtime. 
b.  Includes only contracts  with decreases  that were  signed during the particular period. 
wage cuts has declined  from  a peak of 6.3 percent  in 1983  to 1.0 percent 
in 1988.  Moreover,  only 0.5 percent  of workers  signing  new contracts  in 
1988  took wage cuts. Although  the decline in the number  of workers 
taking  wage cuts has been absorbed  by the "no change" column, the 
shift  is indicative  of an end to the period  of effective nominal  wage cuts. 
For union  workers  receiving  increases, the increase  was 3.4 percent 
in 1988, compared  with 2.6 percent for all union workers. Moreover, 
contracts  that included  positive wage adjustments  were bunched near 
the 3 percent to 4 percent level. Such data suggest two union sectors: 
one in which wages are not increasing  and another  in which wages are 
growing  between 3 percent and 4 percent, at or just below the rate of 
growth  of economywide  wages. 
A  key question is  what happens next in the  sectors that have 
progressed  from wage cuts to zero increases. Certainly,  wage cuts and 
zero increases  are hardly  the equilibrium  rate  of change.6 
6. The restoration  of wage cuts appears  as a wage increase.  Although  the magnitude 
of wage cuts that  have not been restored  is unknown,  it is likely that  there  will be a spike 
in union  wage  increases  over the next few years  as more  cuts are  restored. Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  239 
The recently  negotiated  contract  between the United Steel Workers 
and Bethlehem  Steel gives the latest, although  very partial,  answer to 
the question.  The steel contract  restores  a 8.09 percent  wage cut agreed 
to in 1986.  In addition,  it calls  for annual  increases  of approximately  4.5- 
5.0 percent  a year over the life of the contract,  exclusive of the restored 
cuts.7 
This steel settlement  marks  the sharpest  acceleration  in union  wages. 
But, unlike  in past decades, the steel settlement  will not set a pattern  to 
be copied automatically  by other unions. It is thus an open question 
whether  the contract's  4.5-5.0 percent  annual  increase  is an outlier  or a 
harbinger  of things  to come.8 
In summary,  wage changes in the union sector are clearly lagging 
those in the nonunion  sector. Although  union  wage adjustments  are at a 
modest 2.8 percent rate when prorated across all workers, current 
settlements show a higher rate, equal to 3.4 percent (for contracts 
without COLA clauses). The recent Bethlehem Steel contract is even 
higher, with wage increases in the 4.5-5.0 percent rate. These latter 
figures  are estimates of what currently  negotiated settlements will be 
paying  out in 1989, 1990,  and 1991. 
Union Wage Premiums and Relative Wage Changes 
To understand  the recent pattern of union wage moderation,  it is 
important  to place it in a broader  and more  detailed  historical  record  of 
union and nonunion  wages. To do so, we turn to two complementary 
sets of data. 
The first  are the annual,  cross-sectional  Current  Population  Surveys 
(CPS), which began in 1973.  The surveys allow us to estimate directly 
union  wage premiums,  that  is, the wage gap  between union  workers  and 
comparably  skilled  nonunion  workers.  These data  also permit  disaggre- 
gated  industry  premium  calculations.  The limitation  of the CPS, partic- 
ularly  for pre-1983  samples, is that the confidence  intervals  around  the 
7. The Bethlehem  Steel agreement  with the United  Steelworkers  is covered  in Daily 
Labor  Report,  May 10, 1989,  No. 89, F-I to F-3. This  contract  comports  with  other  recent 
steel contracts.  Steel contracts  dominate  the 1989:2  figures  of table  2. 
8. We do not deal explicitly  with spillovers  among  unions  or between the union  and 
nonunion  sectors.  See Flanagan  (1986). 240  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
premium  estimates  are  too wide to make  a statement  about  year-to-year 
changes  reliable. 
The second data set is the quarterly  establishment  HEI data, which 
began in 1976. These allow for year-to-year  comparisons  but do not 
allow for a calculation  of premiums  for comparably  skilled  workers. In 
this  section  we combine  the two data  sets to calculate  new  wage  premium 
series back  to the 1950s. 
Estimates from  the Current Population  Survey 
The CPS data sample includes observations on full-time workers' 
usual  weekly  earnings  and  hours,  occupation,  education,  industry,  union 
status, region  and city size of residence, and demographic  features. In 
this format,  the skill, demographic,  and locational  variables  are used to 
define wage comparability.  These variables  control for features of the 
individual who holds the job and can be broadly viewed as  "skill 
descriptive.  " Conversely,  a set of union  status  variables  interacted  with 
(one-digit)  industry  dummies  can be used to define  wage differences  that 
are not due to the skill-descriptive  variables. 
K 
(1)  Ln(W) =  aO +  E  ak SKILL VARIABLES 
(  )  k-=1 
I 
+  E  bl,iNONUNIONi  +  b2,i  UNIONi, 
where W is the wage, NONUNIONi  and UNIONi are dummies  repre- 
senting union status in industry  i, and K and I are the total number  of 
skill variables  and industries,  respectively. The union wage premiums 
for each industry  for a particular  year are then calculated  as 
(2)  PREMIUMi =  [exp(Pi)  -  1] x  100, 
where Pi =  b2J-  _=1  bl,i WNU,i  and WNU,i  is the nonunion industry i's 
average  share  of total private  nonunion  employment  over 1973-87.  The 
wage premium  is thus  calculated  as the union  premium  for each industry 
over and above the wage of nonunion  workers of comparable  skill (as 
defined  by the control  variables)  across the private  economy.9 
9. The  traditional  approach  is to compare  union  workers  in  each  industry  with  nonunion 
workers  in the same industry.  We prefer  a comparison  of union  wages by industry  with 
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The resulting union wage premiums  for selected years from 1973 
through  1988  appear  in table 4.'1 To address the difficulties  of making 
year-to-year  comparisons  we have averaged  the years 1973-74, 1976- 
77, and 1987-88 to provide more robust premium  estimates for those 
years. (The choice of years will be made clearer  below.) The aggregate 
union  wage premium,  shown  in the first  column,  is calculated  as a fixed- 
weight  series in which the employment  weights  for aggregating  industry 
premiums  are held constant  at period  means. 
The first finding  is that the union wage premium  is currently  28.1 
percent, roughly  equal to that in 1976-77, but 4.1 percent higher  than 
that  in 1973-74,  the first  two years when CPS estimates  were available. 
A second finding is that premium  trends differ considerably across 
industries.  Because  we have dealt  with  this topic in depth  elsewhere, we 
only  summarize  the  results  here.  " In  the high-premium,  highly  unionized 
industries  (with the exception of construction), premiums  increased 
substantially  overthe sample  period.  Hence, an  industrial  union  premium 
(third  column)  that stood at 22.8 percent in 1973-74 is 29.5 percent in 
1987. On the other hand, in the weakly unionized sectors, premiums 




minius  Industrial  Service 
Year  Aggregateb  constructiouc  sectord  sectore 
1973-74  24.4  19.8  22.8  10.2 
1976-77  28.5  24.5  28.0  13.2 
1983  27.7  24.3  28.8  9.7 
1985  28.7  25.4  30.4  9.7 
1987-88  28.1  24.8  29.5  9.8 
a.  Table presents  estimates  based  on equations  I and 2 in the text.  In each  case  the nonunion  sector  is a fixed- 
weight of all private nonunion industry sectors.  Union industry sector  weights are also fixed across  years.  Premium 
estimates  are  for  the  Current Population  Survey  sample  restricted  to  full-time,  nonagriculttiral workers,  minus 
executives  and professionals.  The estimating  equations  include  controls  for occupation,  region,  race-gender,  usual 
overtime,  the local  unemployment  rate, education,  experience,  squared edtication  and experience,  and experience 
interactive  with gender. 
b.  All private sector union industry sectors. 
c.  All private sector union industry sectors,  but with union construction  removed. 
d.  Contains  mining,  durable  manufacturing,  nondurable  manufacturing,  and  transportation  and  public  utilities 
union sectors. 
e.  Contains retail trade, wholesale  trade, finance,  and services  union sectors. 
10.  For a review of the literature on union wage premiums see Lewis (1986). 
11.  See Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990). 242  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
remained  low. As the fourth  column  shows, the premium  of 9.8 percent 
in 1987  is close to the 10.2  percent  premium  of 1973-74.12 
Two results from the CPS premium  analysis are important  for the 
next section. The first is the need to look at the union premium  in a 
historical  context. Although  the union premium  has decreased during 
the 1980s, it is still above its 1973-74 level. The second result is the 
importance  of interindustry  differences. Given our topic of unions as a 
possible source of cost-push  pressure, we need to isolate the industrial 
sectors  in which  already  high  premiums  (in 1973)  trended  higher  through 
the 1970s  and  early 1980s. 
ECI Union and Nonunion  Wages,  1976-88 
The easiest place to begin an analysis of a time series of union- 
nonunion  wages is 1976, the year the ECI union and nonunion  series 
became  available.  As has been widely noted, these series, shown in the 
first  two columns  of table  5, illustrate  that  union  wage  increases  outpaced 
nonunion increases every year between 1976 and 1982 and that the 
reverse  has been true  every year since. Indeed,  the period  of union  wage 
moderation  since 1983  has now entirely  reversed the union  wage gains 
of 1976-82.  In terms  of 1976  and 1988  endpoints,  these results  are  similar 
to those shown in table 4. The premium  in 1976-77 is similar  to the 
premium  in 1987-88.  '3 
12. A simple  categorization  into industrial  and  nonindustrial  union  sectors, however, 
does not capture  all differences  across industries  in premium  trends. For example, the 
premium  in  nondurable  manufacturing,  the  lowest  in  the  industrial  sector,  is approximately 
equal  to the  premium  in  wholesale  trade,  the  highest  in the  nonindustrial  sector.  Moreover, 
the premiums  in wholesale and retail trade did increase somewhat  during 1973-87. In 
addition,  construction  is an outlier  in the industrial  sector. Although  it had the highest 
premium  in 1973-74,  the premium  trended  downward  after  1973. 
13. In terms  of the time series aspects  of the CPS, a puzzling  result  is that  the decline 
in premiums  during  the late 1980s  appears  to be minor, especially compared  with the 
decline in the ECI premium.  The CPS premiums  peak in 1985  (instead  of 1983)  and the 
decline  from  1985  to 1987  is relatively  small.  There  are  explanations  for this, including  the 
size of the confidence  interval  for annual  estimates,  but  none is entirely  satisfactory.  One 
explanation  may be found  in the disparities  in the rates of change  of occupational  wages 
during  the 1980s.  The CPS has occupational  control  variables  so that, other  things  being 
equal, blue-collar  union workers  are compared  with blue-collar  nonunion  workers.  The 
same  is true  for the education  control  variable.  Based  on ECI  occupational  wage  changes, 
it is clear that managerial  and professional  occupations received by far the highest 
occupational  wage increases  whether  union or nonunion.  Hence, it is possible that the Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  243 
The ECI union-nonunion  series can be improved  on as a measure  of 
union  wage differentials.  Many  nonunion  workers  in the ECI series, for 
example, are in occupations  that are not comparable  to those of union 
workers.  In particular,  executives and  professionals  represent  approxi- 
mately 33 percent  of all private  ECI industry  workers.  14 Our  preferred 
base  group,  denoted  "  nonunion-nonexecutive,  " is constructed  by taking 
the ECI nonunion  series and purging  it of a fixed-weight  contribution 
from  the ECI executives and ECI  professionals  series. 
For our purposes, the major  agreements  series is also preferable  to 
the ECI union series. The major  agreements  data cover the 1960s, an 
advantage  on which we rely heavily below. The series also is better 
linked to the collective bargaining  data in tables 2 and 3 and has an 
advantage  over the ECI union series in terms of compositional shift 
properties.  15 
In calculating a union-nonunion  wage premium for 1976-89, our 
preferred  measure thus has the major  agreements series as the union 
numerator  and the ECI nonunion-nonexecutive  series as the denomi- 
nator.  In the third  column  we show our preferred  union wage premium 
series. The premium  is 31.0 percent in 1976,  increasing  to 40.7 percent 
in 1982  and  then declining  to 31.3 percent  in the first  quarter  of 1989. 
Given the availability  of the ECI data  back to 1976,  it would be easy 
nonunion  work force most directly  comparable  to the union work force received even 
lower  increases  than  our ECI nonexecutive  series suggests.  Another  explanation  may  be 
found  in the way workers  are  laid  off in declining  industries.  Assuming  that  older  workers 
have the highest  premium,  layoffs based on seniority  have a compositional  shift toward 
higher  premiums. 
14. "Relative  Importance  of Employment  Cost Index  Components,"  Office  of Com- 
pensation  and  Working  Conditions,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  February  1989. 
15. The ECI  union  and,  for that  matter,  the ECI nonunion  series  are not fixed-weight 
series. The fixed  weights  of the ECI sample  extend only to occupation  and  industry.  For 
our  purposes,  this  is more  of a problem  for  the ECI  union  than  for  the ECI  nonunion  series. 
There  have been major  industrial  shifts in the union  sector toward  service (industry  and 
occupation)  workers  so that  the ECI  union  series  increasingly  reflects  developments  in the 
union-service  sectors. (However, since wage changes are calculated  for each category 
and  the  aggregation  is across  wage  changes,  the more  severe  compositional  problem  found 
in the HEI index is not created.  In the HEI index, a shift toward  low-wage  occupations 
would  cause the HEI to show a negative  change,  even if all wages  remained  unchanged.) 
The major  agreements  series overweights  the industrial  unions because it excludes 
union contracts  covering  fewer than 1,000 workers, but this overweighting  is likely to 
cause  less distortion  than  the shifting  weights  in the ECI  union.  Fortunately,  for  the period 




Rate of wage change  agreements-  Major 
Rate___of_wage___change  _  ECI  agreements-  HEI high- 
ECI  ECI  nonunion-  HEI low-  union-HEI 
Year  union  nonunion  nonexecutiveb  unionc  low-uniond 
1947  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  21.8 
1950  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  24.2 
1955  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  28.2 
1956  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  28.9 
1957  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  29.7 
1958  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  31.4 
1959  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  26.5  32.6 
1960  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  26.7  32.6 
1961  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  26.5  32.5 
1962  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  25.0  31.4 
1963  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  24.5  30.6 
1964  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  23.5  29.4 
1965  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  22.1  28.0 
1966  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  20.3  26.3 
1967  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  19.1  24.0 
1968  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  18.3  23.5 
1969  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  17.6  22.5 
1970  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  20.7  21.2 
1971  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  24.0  22.3 
1972  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  24.3  24.9 
1973  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  25.7  26.3 
1974  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  27.9  26.9 
1975  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  30.1  30.4 
1976  8.1  6.8  31.0  32.0  33.7 
1977  7.6  6.6  32.8  32.7  35.3 
1978  8.0  7.6  33.2  32.7  35.9 
1979  9.0  8.5  33.6  34.6  37.2 
1980  10.9  8.0  36.9  36.2  38.0 
1981  9.6  8.5  39.2  37.3  39.9 
1982  6.5  6.1  40.7  37.5  40.4 
1983  4.6  5.2  39.8  35.1  39.3 
1984  3.4  4.5  39.6  35.5  39.8 
1985  3.1  4.6  37.4  35.6  40.1 
1986  2.0  3.5  35.9  34.6  38.7 
1987  2.6  3.6  35.8  34.7  37.0 
1988  2.2  4.5  32.6  32.5  35.0 
1989:1  2.5  4.8  31.3  31.0  32.8 
1989:2  2.6  4.6  ...  ..  ... 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Results  presented  are ratios  of the specified  union  and nonunion  data, less a benchmark  factor.  The factor  for 
each premium  series  equals  the difference  between  the average  actual  wage  differential  from  1973-75  and  the average 
estimated  wage  premium  from  equations  1 and 2 over the period  1973-75. 
b. The major  agreements  union  series are effective  mean  or median  (before  1968)  wage adjustments  (see table 1, 
note c). Prior  to 1966,  construction,  finance,  and services  were excluded  from  this series. 
c. Low union  density  industries  (listed  by percent  union  in ascending  order):  finance,  insurance,  and real  estate; 
service;  crude  and  gas mining;  retail  trade;  textile  manufacturing;  and  wholesale  trade.  Prior  to 1964,  service  industry 
wages  are assumed  to remain  a constant  (1964)  proportion  of average  wages  in the rest of the nonunion  category. 
d. High union density industries  (listed by percent  union in descending  order):  railroad;  coal mining;  primary 
metals;  transportation  equipment  manufacturing;  paper;  telephone  communications;  stone, clay, and glass; metal 
mining;  petroleum  refining;  food products;  fabricated  metals;  rubber;  machinery;  electrical  equipment;  chemicals; 
construction;  tobacco;  and  electric  power. Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  245 
to start  an analysis of union wages with 1976.  Indeed, the literature  on 
union  wages frequently  uses 1976  as a starting  point  because of the need 
for data consistency. For the reasons noted above, however, it would 
also be misleading.  The finding  that union premiums  today are at 1976 
levels is technically correct, but a broader conclusion that today's 
premium  is in line with past premiums  over a longer time period is 
incorrect.  It is to this topic that  we now turn. 
Tracking Relative Wages Back to the 1950s 
To analyze the variation in union wage premiums before 1973, 
alternative  data sources must be introduced.  To provide a continuous 
measure of union wage changes back to 1959, we splice a series for 
median  wages (available  back  to 1959)  onto the series for effective mean 
wage adjustments  (available  back only to 1968).  Before 1959  for a union 
series and  before 1976  for a nonunion  series, we rely on average  hourly 
earnings data. Because these series are not divided into union and 
nonunion  observations,  we treat  the sectors with very high  percentages 
of union employment  as representative  of union wage trends and the 
sectors  with  very  low  percentages  of union  employment  as representative 
of nonunion  wage trends. To be comparable  with the ECI and CPS 
figures,  the series are benchmarked  off CPS union wage premiums  for 
197375.  16 
The  fourth  column  of table  5 shows the resulting  union  wage premium 
series based on the major  agreements  series as the numerator  and the 
HEI low-union  series as the denominator.  The series begins at 26.5 in 
1959.  During  the 1960s,  nonunion  wage  gains  outpaced  union  wage  gains, 
with the premium  declining  from 26.7 in 1960  to a low of 17.6 in 1969. 
Between 1969  and 1976  (when the ECI tracking  becomes available)  the 
union  wage  premium  regains  and  then surpasses  the 1959  level. Between 
1976  and  1989  the  new  series  tracks  the  major  agreements-ECI  nonunion- 
nonexecutive.  This series shows that  the union  premium  in 1989  is above 
16. To control  for  industrial  shifts,  we adopt  fixed  (at  midsample)  weights  for  the  union 
and  nonunion  series. Since our goal is to trace  union  premiums  back through  the 1950s, 
wage series  beginning  later  than 1947  are  omitted.  The resulting  omissions,  however, are 
not a serious  problem  given  the evidence  from  the CPS. The industrial  sectors  highlighted 
in the CPS  results  are  the ones with  the available  wage series. In the nonunion  sector, the 
main  problem  is that  the service sector  has wage data  only after 1963.  Since the inclusion 
of services  is important,  this series  is spliced  into the nonunion  series. 246  Brookintgs  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
the level existing in 1960, prior to the 1960s decade of union wage 
moderation. 
In the final column, we use the highly unionized HEI series as the 
numerator  with the same nonunion  denominator  as in the fourth col- 
umn.  17 Given longer  time series, we are able to track  a union-nonunion 
premium  back to 1947  and to add  another  premium  cycle. The premium 
increases  throughout  the later 1940s  and all of the 1950s.  From  a low of 
21.8 percent  in 1947,  the premium  grows to 32.6 percent  by 1959. 
Some Preliminary Conclusions 
An analysis  of these series helps answer  the question  of whether  wage 
developments  after 1989  are likely to be a replay  of developments  after 
1969.  If the union  wage premium  is a guide, the answer  is no. In 1969  the 
union wage premium  was close to its series low, having reversed the 
entire  increase  from 1947.  In 1989,  the premium  remains  much  closer to 
series highs than lows. The key to the high premiums  existing today is 
that the increase in the premium  from 1969  to 1983  was much greater 
than the increase of the 1950s  that preceded the decline of the 1960s. 
Hence, if history repeats itself, 1989 should not be the start of a new 
inflationary  trend  in union  wages. The premium  is too high. 
Given a division  of all industries  with wage series, our union  series includes  the most 
heavily  unionized  groups,  while  the nonunion  series includes  the least heavily  unionized. 
The middle  group  was omitted  from  both. The level of each group  does comport  with the 
hypothesis  that more strongly  unionized  industries  will achieve union wage premiums. 
Hence, for the most strongly  unionized  series, the industry  relative  wage in 1975  is 20.7 
percent  higher  than  the average  industry  wage. Premiums  in the next heavily unionized 
sector are approximately  half those of the most unionized.  Finally, the least unionized 
group  has the lowest wage premium.  In 1975,  its wage is 13.5  percent  below the average 
wage  for comparably  skilled  workers  throughout  the economy. 
17. The premium  series in the final  column  does not include  construction  in the union 
sector.  We  also constructed  a union  premium  series  that  includes  construction  in the  union 
base. A comparison  of the two locates the period  when the construction  union  premium 
diverged  from the other industrial  union premiums.  The series excluding  construction 
begins  4.5 percentage  points  higher  than  the series  with  construction.  In the late 1960s,  the 
gap begins to close, and, by 1973, the premium  series including  construction  is 0.7 
percentage  point higher  than the series exluding  construction.  Hence, the construction 
premium  increases immediately  before the starting  date of our first CPS survey. This 
suggests that the construction  unions were the leaders in the timing of the premium 
increase.  To date, they have also been the leaders  in the premium  decline. Michael  L. Wachter  and William  H. Carter  247 
But history does not always repeat itself, and, moreover, a high 
premium  hardly settles the next move in the premium.  After all, the 
ability of unions to maintain  a high premium  may be indicative of an 
underlying  core  of strength  that  could  reestablish  itself  in  an  environment 
of low unemployment  rates. To see whether premiums remain high 
because of union strength or in spite of  weakness, we  must look 
elsewhere, to indicators  of union  health  and  relative  bargaining  power. 
Other Indicators of Union Economic Power 
Other indicators  of the near-term  direction of the union premium 
include four important  indexes of union power: union employment 
shares,  strike  activity,  management  opposition  to unions,  and  labor  law. 
Union Employment Shares  and Concession  Bargaining 
In  the  textbook  labor  economics  model,  the  economic  power  of unions 
is tied to the degree to which they organize workers in the relevant 
product  market.  The first  three  columns  of table 6 track  three  measures 
of the  degree  of unionization.  The  first,  union  membership  as a  percentage 
of total employment,  peaks in the early 1950s, with more than one in 
three  workers  belonging  to unions. That percentage  trends  downward, 
but during  the 1969-77  run-up  in the wage premium  one in four  workers 
is still a union member.  The percentage  falls at an accelerating  rate to 
one in five from 1978  to 1982, a period of a stable, but slightly rising, 
premium. As the premium then declines slightly, membership  falls 
further  to one in eight  in 1988. 
Unlike the union  percentages, which trend downward  in the 1950s, 
the second  measure  of unionization,  absolute  number  of union  members 
(second column),  does not peak until  the early 1970s  and remains  very 
close to that peak value in 1977. Once the absolute number  of union 
members  begins  to decline, however, it declines sharply,  dropping  more 
than  25 percent  between 1979  and 1988.18 
The  ability  of unions  to influence  political  and  legal  outcomes  involving 
unions may depend on their representation  in the overall labor force. 
18. For a discussion  of the causes of the decline in union  membership,  see Edwards 
and  Swaim  (1986,  pp. 97-102);  Dickens  and  Leonard  (1985);  Farber  (1987). C13 
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Almost  surely  the decline in total numbers  is damaging  to unions' dollar 
revenue,  thus to their  ability  to lobby and  to represent  workers  success- 
fully in collective bargaining,  including  conducting  successful strikes, 
paying  for the direct costs of collective bargaining  including  court and 
legal costs, and paying salaries to union officers and employees. But 
union  membership  in the overall economy, although  useful, is hardly  a 
complete  statistic. Unions have always been strong  in certain  sectors of 
the economy, such as in manufacturing,  mining, construction, and 
transportation  (and, more recently, government),  while other sectors 
have been largely  unorganized. 
The third  measure  of union  power, and by far the most important,  is 
the percentage  of union employment in traditional  union strongholds 
(third  column).  Based on the CPS samples, we calculate  that, as late as 
1973-74 (the first two years the CPS figures are available), unions 
represented  47.2 percent of full-time nonexecutive, nonprofessional 
employment  in construction,  mining,  durable  manufacturing,  and  trans- 
portation  and public utilities.'9  In 1987, this figure had fallen to 31.2 
percent.  In construction,  the decline  was from  43 percent  to 26 percent. 
In  mining,  the decline  was from  56  percent  to 27  percent,  and  in durables, 
from  50 percent  to 32 percent. In transportation  and  public  utilities, the 
decline  was from  58 percent  to 42 percent. 
Consequently,  in most of the traditionally  heavily unionized U.S. 
industries,  there  is now at least a fringe,  and  often  a substantial  presence, 
of nonunion  workers  and firms.  With  international  capacity  included  in 
traded  goods, the union  coverage  of relevant  capacity  is obviously even 
smaller.20  Based on these latter percentages, unions appear to  be 
critically  weaker  in 1989  than  they were even a decade earlier,  certainly 
much  weaker  than  they were in 1969. 
That union premiums  remain stubbornly  high even in the face of 
declining  employment shares may seem puzzling. In other words, if 
unions  have been weakened, how do they succeed in maintaining  high 
premiums?  One answer is that unions have fought hardest  to maintain 
high  premiums  for  their  senior  members,  while  firms  have  fought  hardest 
to retain or increase their flexibility in shifting  jobs out of the union 
19. Although  these figures  can be faulted  for being  at too high  a level of aggregation, 
two-digit  industries  show similar  results. 
20. On  the effects  of international  competition,  see Vroman  and  Abowd  (1988). 250  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
sector-for  example, by subcontracting  work to lower-cost nonunion 
firms,  shifting  work to nonunion  subsidiaries  of the same firm,  directly 
using nonunion  workers for certain tasks, or substituting  capital for 
labor.  Firms  are  more  willing  and  able  to accept higher  wages  for a union 
work force that is a declining  percentage  of their labor  or overall input 
costs. A second answer is that in cases where such flexibility  has not 
been possible, some firms  have exited the union sector entirely. This 
issue is discussed later in the context of the strike and decertification 
election  data.  Wage  reductions  that  occur  after  a firm  becomes nonunion 
will  obviously  not  lower  the union  premium.  A third  answer,  and  perhaps 
the most important,  is that some of the adjustment  has been in the form 
of a reduction  in market  share  of unionized  firms.2' 
Strike Activity 
The amazing  feature  of the strike  data  in table  6 is that  strikes  have all 
but disappeared.  Strikes were frequent  throughout  the 1969-77  period 
of increasing  union premiums,  averaging  76.4 per union member  on an 
index with 1967  = 100.  They fell to 42.9 per union member  during  1978- 
82, as premiums  leveled off. Strike  activity then plummeted  during  the 
period  of declining  premiums  and union employment  shares  after 1983. 
Since  the strike  series  has membership  as a deflator,  the decline  in strikes 
is particularly  impressive. Many  fewer union members  are involved in 
many  fewer strikes. 
We believe that  the answer  to the puzzling  decline in strike  activity  is 
found in the final  three columns  of table 6. The point to be made is that 
the parties  now litigate rather  than strike  over their differences. When 
21. In earlier  papers,  we have noted  the relationship  between  high  premiums  and  low 
employment  shares, and argued  that the relationship  went from  exogenous  premiums  to 
endogenous  employment  shares.  For  example,  in  the  increasing-premium  industrial  sector, 
union  employment  shares  have declined  sharply.  Conversely,  in sectors  with small  wage 
premiums,  such as services and finance, unions have fared better, maintaining  their 
employment  share.  In  services,  where  the premium  remained  unchanged,  the  employment 
share  has increased  3 percentage  points. See Linneman  and Wachter  (1986);  Linneman, 
Wachter,  and  Carter  (1990).  A similar  argument  has  been  advanced,  in  a series  of important 
papers,  by Hirsch  and  others. They have shown that  high  union  premiums  have resulted 
in significant  profit declines in unionized firms and, perhaps more significantly  for 
employment  shares, in lower rates of investment  in plant, equipment,  and R&D. See 
Hirsch  and Connolly  (1987);  Addison  and Hirsch  (1989);  Bronars  and Deere (1990);  and 
Ruback  and  Zimmerman  (1984). Michael  L. Wachter  and William  H. Carter  251 
strikes  occur, they are now more  frequently  a fight  to the finish,  with the 
firm looking to union decertification  rather  than to a new contract to 
resolve the strike. 
The fifth  column,  which shows days of idleness per involved worker, 
provides  an indicator  of the intensity  of the strikes  that do occur. Since 
the divisor is the number  of members involved in strikes, the actual 
number  of strikes does not affect the series. Instead, the series is high 
when the strikes are prolonged. Unlike the strike-per-member  series, 
this figure  is currently  close to all-time  highs. Although  there are many 
fewer strikes  now than  in the past, once a strike  begins, it is likely to last 
much longer than it would have in the past. Strike intensity has been 
high throughout  the 1980s as the premium  first leveled off and then 
declined.  Conversely,  in the early 1950s  and  late 1960s  when  the number 
of strikes  was high, intensity  was low. 
Unfair Labor Practices  and Decertification  Petitions 
The  last two columns  of table  6 present  figures  on the number  of unfair 
labor  practice  allegations  brought  against  employers  and  the number  of 
union decertification  elections requested, each an index per union 
member, with 1967  = 100. Unfair labor practices are management  or 
union  actions  that  violate the National  Labor  Relations  Act. Two of the 
most frequent  unfair  labor practice allegations  involve section 8(a)(3), 
which prohibits  management  discrimination  against union members, 
and section 8(a)(5),  which requires  management  to bargain  collectively 
with the union.  The prototype  8(a)(3)  case emerges  during  union  certifi- 
cation and decertification  elections, but can also occur during  strikes, 
particularly  when replacement  workers  are being hired. The prototype 
8(a)(5) case involves a firm taking a unilateral  action that the union 
believes to be a mandatory  topic of bargaining. 
The sharp  upward  trend  in unfair  labor  practice  allegations  beginning 
in the late 1960s  and  early 1970s  provides  solid empirical  support  for the 
hypothesis  that  management  opposition  to unions has increased  signifi- 
cantly  since the late 1960s.  Richard  Freeman  has fitted  a wage premium 
to this unfair  labor practice data and found a significant  relationship 
between  higher  premiums  and  increased  unfair  labor  practices.  A second 
equation  showed a further  link from  increased  unfair  labor  practices  to 252  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
lowerrates  of new  organizing.22  We  have  extended  Freeman's  regression 
analysis, which runs through  1980, through 1987, using our premiums 
and  unfair  labor  practices  series, and  the relationships  remain.  That  the 
wage premium  peaks and begins to decline in the 1980s fits with the 
decline  in unfair  labor  practices  in the past few years. 
Although  it has been claimed  by some that management  opposition 
to unions toughened  with the Reagan-appointed  National Labor Rela- 
tions Board,  the evidence does not support  the point. In the data  above, 
the big uptick  in unfair  labor  practices  begins during  the late 1970s,  not 
the early 1980s.  The timing  of the increase is thus more consistent with 
the increasing  premium  than with changes in Washington.23  Similarly, 
by 1987,  allegations  of unfair  labor practices reverted  to the level first 
reached  in 1978. 
Are the Legal  Rules  Changing? 
The strength  of labor  unions  and  their  ability  to negotiate  wages above 
market-clearing  levels are ultimately  determined  by the legal rules that 
govern the union representation  and collective bargaining  processes. 
The question we address  is whether  the Republican  administrations  of 
the 1980s, especially through  changes in the makeup of the National 
Labor  Relations  Board  and  Supreme  Court,  have changed  the legal  rules 
of the game. The alternative  is that management  practice has changed 
the way the rules are applied.24 
Two issues  of  particular importance in the  1980s are the rules 
governing  the ability of management  to reallocate resources from the 
union  sector and  into the nonunion  sector  and  those governing  the rights 
of management  in hiring  replacement  workers  and  decertifying  unions.25 
These issues have been actively litigated before the National Labor 
Relations  Board, and, on appeal,  before circuit  courts  and the Supreme 
Court. 
22. Freeman  (1986). 
23. See Flanagan  (1987, p. 100), who concludes that "the sustained  growth  of the 
unions'  wage  advantage  during  the 1970s  . . . appears  to have had  a profound  influence  on 
the growth  of unfair  labor  practice  charges." 
24. The analysis  of this section  is drawn  from  Wachter  and  Cohen  (1988). 
25. The  ability  to reallocate  resources  is at  the  heart  of Lawrence  and  Lawrence  (1985), 
which argues that unions played an end game during  the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
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A clear example of a change in labor relations that springs  from a 
change  in management  practice  rather  than  a change  in the legal rules is 
the increase  in the hiring  of replacement  workers. Since 1938,  the key 
case in this area has been Mackay Radio, which allows firms to hire 
replacement  workers  during  a strike  and  to offer  them  permanent  jobs.26 
Until the late 1970s  or 1980s,  firms  rarely  made  use of their  rights  under 
Mackay Radio to hire permanent  replacements. Instead, firms used 
managers  to replace striking  workers temporarily.  When replacement 
workers  were hired,  they were seldom  offered  permanent  jobs. 
When  strikes  occur  today, replacement  workers  are more  likely to be 
offered permanent  jobs. Once management  has adopted this strategy, 
resolution  of the strike  becomes not  only more  difficult,  as union  hostility 
increases, but also less important  to management.  The result is longer 
strikes.  After  a certain  duration,  and  after  a critical  mass of replacement 
workers  is hired,  workers  can petition  for a new election to decertify  the 
union. 
Direct evidence proving  that firms  are increasingly  using their 1938 
rights  under  Mackay  Radio is not available.  Given that hiring  replace- 
ments is often linked  to decertification  petitions, however, the decerti- 
fication  data  in table  6 indirectly  supports  the claim,  as does the dramatic 
increase  in strike  intensity.  More  broadly,  the unfair  labor  practice  data 
indicate  increased  management  opposition  to unions,  with  the significant 
increase  during  the late 1970s.  With  the legal rule  unchanged  since 1938, 
one must  look for other explanations.  An obvious one is the high union 
premiums  that  have been around  only since the 1970s.27 
The rules  governing  plant  closings and  relocation  are based on newer 
decisions. It is in this area that unionized  firms  may now have greater 
discretion  than  they once enjoyed  or, more correctly, thought  that they 
enjoyed.  At issue is which topics are mandatory  subjects  of bargaining. 
For example, if the decision to relocate is not a mandatory  topic, 
26.  NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.  333 (1938). 
27. Political  influences,  however, certainly  do play a role. For example, it can be 
argued  that the Reagan  administration's  firing  of striking  air traffic  controllers  was the 
"green  light"  to firms  to hire  replacements.  Of  course, the cases are  not identical  because 
the air  traffic  controllers'  strike  was illegal.  Still, illegal  strikes  by municipal  unions  in the 
1960s  were  more  frequently  resolved  by making  the  strikes  legal,  rather  than  by discharging 
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management  can  unilaterally  implement  and  the union  cannot  strike  over 
the decision  to relocate.28 
In simple  terms, the rules mean  that management  decisions to imple- 
ment  partial  plant  closing, work relocation,  asset sales, and even some 
types of subcontracting  are not mandatory  topics. This is especially the 
case when there  are  circumstances  that  require  quick  action  and  involve 
a valid business  justification.  Cases would be decided differently  if the 
decision was motivated  by "anti-union  animus." The key point for our 
purposes  is that managerial  decisions based on the high  cost of a union 
contract  satisfy the business  justification  rule. More generally,  the law 
protects  only the bargaining  process and  not bargaining  outcomes, such 
as wage premiums  .29 
Some Additional  Conclusions 
From this review of employment  shares and institutional  variables 
we find no evidence that a change in union wage premium  regimes is 
likely to occur. First, unions are continuing  to experience employment 
losses, and union power, as measured by the percentage of workers 
unionized in relevant product  markets, is much lower than in the late 
1960s. Second, management  in the 1980s has a more confrontational 
approach  to collective bargaining  than it had in the 1960s, when the 
regime  last changed  to increasing  premiums.  Given the default  settings 
of labor  law, a determined  management  has considerable  discretion  to 
reduce  the effects of high  union  premiums.  One  reason  that  union  wages 
do not appear  to be under  greater  pressure  is that, in some cases, firms 
have either shifted work out of the union sector or become entirely 
nonunion. 
28.  First National  Maintenance  Corporation v. NLRB,  452 U.S.  666 (1981), is the 
Supreme  Court's 1981  case involving  plant  closings. The NLRB followed this ruling  in 
1984  in  deciding  Otis  Elevator  Company,  269  NLRB  891  (1984),  which  governs  relocations. 
These cases are more susceptible  to the argument  that the law has changed, since in 
deciding  First  National  Maintenance,  the  Supreme  Court  primarily  relied  on  the  concurring 
rather than the majority opinion in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,  379 U.S. 
203, 209(1964). 
29. Although  the  law  does not  explicitly  address  the  premium  issue, it is at  least  implied 
in the cases. For example, in Otis Elevator,  a case in which a firm  shifted  work from a 
high-cost  union  plant  to a low-cost nonunion  plant,  the parties  themselves  stipulated  that 
the firm's  decision  did  not involve anti-union  animus.  The court  then  ruled  that  the firm's 
decision  was  covered  by a broad  management  perogative  clause  in  the  collective  bargaining 
contract.  See Wachter  and  Cohen  (1988). Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  255 
Wage Change Equations for the Union and Nonunion Sectors 
Our discussion of the union sector has developed data and docu- 
mented,  rather  than  explained,  changes  in  union  regimes.  Unfortunately, 
the institutional  changes  discussed above are simply  not rich enough  to 
serve as explanatory  variables. Hence, to predict the course of union 
wages and  the wage premium,  we must  turn  to equations  that  have been 
developed  to explain  time series of aggregate  wage developments.  The 
two that we use are those presented at Brookings  Panel meetings by 
George  Perry  and  Robert  Gordon.  Central  to our  use of these equations 
as forecasting  devices is our view that  a norm  shift over the near  term  is 
unlikely. 
The  equation  specification  most in  keeping  with  the spirit  of this paper 
is the Perry  norm  model. A difference  is that  his norms  describe  discrete 
shifts in the rate of wage inflation  while ours describe changes in the 
direction  of the union  premium.  Although  these two norms  are concep- 
tually  different,  we find  reverses in the premium  trend  coincident with 
Perry's break points for his aggregate  wage norm shifts. The union 
premium  turns  upward  in 1970  just as Perry's  norms  signal,  other  things 
being equal, increasing  wage inflation. Similarly, the premium  turns 
downward  in 1983just  as Perry's  norm  shifts  to decreasingwage  inflation. 
Perry intended his norm shifts to fit the aggregate data with the 
implication  that they are as relevant to the union as to the nonunion 
sector. Of course, our union  premium  is also determined  by the actions 
of the two sectors. Although  our  favored  interpretation  of events is one 
of exogenous behavioral  shifts in the union sector, we do not preclude 
the existence of norm  shifts in the nonunion  sector. 
The second model  that we use is the Gordon  model.30  It differs  from 
the Perry  specification  in that it subtracts  the inter-NBER  benchmark 
trend  rate  of productivity  growth  from  the dependent  variable.  Gordon's 
equations  also have a broader  array  of variables,  each of which  we tested 
in both  union  and  nonunion  equations. 
Given our limited  agenda, we have not embodied  our equations  in a 
more  general  model with price and unemployment  equations-a  limita- 
tion that we do not view as serious for our parameter  estimates since 
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there  is little  evidence  of important  simultaneous  equations  bias  in single- 
equation  wage models, even when those equations  are  for the aggregate 
economy. Obviously, the problems are more severe for our forecast 
period,  which misses the feedback  from  wages to prices. Given the lags 
in the equations, this is primarily  a limitation  in the out years of our 
forecasts. 
Our  dependent  union and nonunion  variables  are new and have not 
previously  been used in wage equations.  The major  agreements  series is 
available  in one form or another  back to 1959  and requires  only a few 
adjustments  to provide comparable  numbers  throughout  that period.31 
By beginning  our sample  period  with 1959  we have a robust  measure  of 
union wages. Our ECI nonunion-nonexecutive  series is available  only 
back to 1975. Since we are most interested  in current  values, and the 
ECI  is now 14  years  old, it is inefficient  to throw  out  the ECI  information. 
Although  it has  pitfalls,  our  approach  is to splice  together  the comparable 
ECI and HEI low-union  series. (These two series are used in the fourth 
column  of table  5.)32 
The regression  results appear  in table 7. The Perry  norm union and 
nonunion  equations  are  equations  1  and  2, respectively.  The  comparable 
Gordon equations are equations 3 and 4. A hybrid of the two is in 
equations 5 and 6.33 
Although  the individual  lagged  wage and price terms vary across the 
equations,  they all  have sums  that  are  insignificantly  different  from  unity. 
The differences  across the equations  are not surprising  since the joint 
confidence interval  is an ellipsoid that allows the individual  values to 
31. Effective  mean  wage adjustments  are available  back  to 1968.  Before 1968,  we use 
medians  that are available  back to 1959.  Quarterly  data  are only available  after  the third 
quarter  of 1973.  Before  that  date, we estimate  within-year  quarterly  variations  from  a log- 
linear  projection  onto seasonal  dummies  (restricted  to a zero sum)  and  quarterly  variation 
in the HEI union  series. With  a starting  date of 1959,  we need the HEI union  series only 
for initial  lagged  values. 
32. The HEI and ECI are not very different  from each other during  the mid-1970s 
when the ECI is first  available,  and so we have no preconceptions  as to whether  the ECI 
series, if available  back to the 1950s, would have diverged  from the HEI. As a first 
approximation,  we simply splice the HEI series to their comparable  ECI or major 
agreements  series. 
33. Unlike  Gordon's  dependent  variable,  which includes  an adjustment  for nonwage 
benefits,  we use straight  wages, because  we lack  nonwage  benefits  broken  into union  and 
nonunion  sectors. Similarly,  we do not attempt  to measure  productivity  across  union  and 
nonunion  sectors.  Hence, his productivity  trend  is subtracted  from  the  dependent  variable 
in equations  3 and  4 of table  7. Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  257 
vary  greatly  while  keeping  the sum  close to their  given  level. As expected, 
the sum of the lags is smallest in the Perry equation, where the norm 
dummies  reduce  their  impact. 
The unemployment  term  is also generally  significant,  with the largest 
impact in the nonunion  equations. That result is expected, given the 
assumption  that union wage setting is less attuned to excess demand 
conditions  than  is nonunion  wage setting. 
We used all of Gordon's  variables  in unreported  equations,  but of the 
additional  variables  only the CPI-relative  (CPI-GNP  deflator)  was statis- 
tically  significant  in  most  equations.  Hence, the  other  terms  were omitted 
from  all of the specifications.34  The CPI-relative  term  could not be used 
jointly with  the Perry  norm  shift  variables  so we omitted  the CPI-relative 
variable  from  the reported  Perry  equations. 
In terms of the norm variables, the union equation has significant 
norm  shifts in both 1970  and 1983.  The presence of norm  shifts is tested 
by a norm coefficient significantly  different  from the preceding norm 
variable. For example, in equation 1 of table 7, with an initial norm 
intercept of 3.43, the first norm shift in 1970 causes union wages to 
accelerate, other things being equal, by 2.46 percentage  points. After 
1983,  union  wages decelerate  by 3.60 percentage  points. These shifts  are 
truly  enormous. 
The nonunion equation exhibits more moderate norm shifts. In 
equation  2, the nonunion  acceleration  in the 1970s  is an insignificant  0.53 
percentage  point. The deceleration  after 1983  is a high 2.54 percentage 
points,  but  even this  is 1.1  percentage  points  less than  in  the union  sector. 
These equations  suggest that the changes in the premium  are driven 
more  by the union  sector than  by the nonunion  sector. Most important, 
they indicate  that  the enormous  run-up  in the premium  in the 1970s  was 
driven  by an acceleration  in union  wages. The deceleration  of wages in 
the 1980s  is, however, ajoint event. 
The story behind  the norm shifts fits our reading  of the institutional 
literature  as well as our earlier  work. We view the post-1970  premium 
increase, particularly  after the oil crisis of  1973, as being partly a 
consequence of contract stickiness in the union sector in the face of 
supply  shocks. The parties  viewed COLA-type  clauses as assigning  the 
34. These  include  the productivity  deviation,  relative  import  and  food-fuel  prices,  and 
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risk of inflation  to the firm.  The parties  would not simply  rewrite  those 
terms  when  the inflation  occurred,  even when it was an atypical  inflation 
in which CPI increases outdistanced  GNP deflator  increases.35  (Hence 
the correlation between the norm shift terms and the CPI-relative 
mentioned  above.) This explanation  also fits the fact that the premium 
in construction  increased  only in the early 1970s  and decreased there- 
after. Because construction  contracts  tend to be relatively short-term, 
they have fewer COLA  clauses. 
In this framework,  the premium  run-up  between 1969  and 1972  can 
be viewed as a purposeful  recapturing  of the premium  lost during  the 
1960s.  But the events thereafter  were partially  an accident  of the unique 
economic events. This can hardly  be the entire story, but the evidence 
of the institutional  variables  is not rich enough to allow for statistical 
tests. 
After 1983, with concession bargaining, the parties rewrote the 
contracts,  including  suspending  COLA  clauses and  substituting  bonuses 
for base rate increases. Based solely on actions taken in the unionized 
sector, a large  decline in the premium  might  have been expected. Thus, 
the union norm  shift in equation 1 should  have closed the premium  3.6 
percentage  points per year. (This is of course an estimate  rather  than a 
result from a dynamic simulation.)  However, as shown in table 5, the 
peak premium  of 40.7 actually  decreased  at an average  rate of only 1.3 
percentage  points  per year  from 1982  to 1988.  This smaller  closing is the 
result  of the nonunion  norm  shift. (Equations  1 and  2 predict  a premium 
decline, due solely to the norm variables, of 1.1 percentage  points per 
year.) In other words, the collective bargaining  parties would have 
expected their actions to gain greater  relative cost savings than they 
actually  did.  For  the  union  sector  to close the  premium  given  the  response 
of the nonunion  sector would have forced a major  reduction  in nominal 
wages. 
One  of the interesting  features  of Gordon's  equation  is that  he deducts 
a long-run  productivity  growth  rate term from his dependent  variable. 
In equations 5 and 6, we included Gordon's productivity  term as an 
independent  value. Since the long-run  rate is a fixed number over a 
cycle, each discrete  change  acts like a Perry  norm  shift. Hence, in these 
hybrid  equations  norm  shifts  become the change  in either  the Perry  norm 
35. Wachter  (1986). Michael L. Wachter and William H. Carter  261 
Table  8. Wage  Forecasts,  1989-92a 
Percent 
Year  Union  Nonunion  Change in premium 
Perry  specification 
1989  3.92  4.37  - 0.45 
1990  4.46  4.69  - 0.23 
1991  4.71  5.06  - 0.35 
1992  4.69  4.95  - 0.26 
Sum of change 
in premium  ...  ...  -  1.29 
Gordon  specification 
1989  3.61  4.74  -  1.13 
1990  3.95  5.28  -  1.33 
1991  4.91  5.54  - 0.63 
1992  5.52  5.49  0.03 
Sum of change 
in premium  ...  ...  - 3.06 
Hybrid  norm  specification 
1989  3.71  4.78  -  1.07 
1990  4.01  5.29  -  1.28 
1991  4.99  5.57  - 0.58 
1992  5.60  5.47  0.13 
Sum of change 
in premium  ...  ...  - 2.80 
a.  The forecasts  of  independent  variables  are those  of  Data Resources,  Inc.,  as  of  March  1989. Specific  values 
are the following  annual averages  for  1989-92,  respectively.  Unemployment:  5.4,  5.5,  5.5,  5.5;  fixed-weight  GNP 
deflator: 4.4,  4.8,  4.6,  4.5; consumer  price index: 4.8,  4.6,  4.9,  4.9. 
variables  or changes in the impact of the productivity  variable. As a 
consequence, norm variables have to be considered  jointly with the 
productivity  variables. What we find is surprisingly  little effect; the 
impact  of the productivity  term  is to allow for a somewhat  faster rate of 
nonunion  wage growth  and a slower rate of union growth  beginning  in 
the late 1970s.36 
Table  8 shows the forecasts (as annual  averages)  from the equations 
of table 7. (The year 1989  consists of one quarter  of actuals and three 
quarters  of projections.)  The forecasts show an acceleration, albeit a 
modest  one, in wage inflation.  In the union equation,  the Perry  specifi- 
cation forecast for 1989-92 and the Gordon specification  forecast for 
36. In an earlier  draft  we also included  equations  for our HEI union and nonunion 
equations.  These equations  were generally  similar  to their  major  agreements  and spliced 
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1989-91  are compatible  with  the earlier  warning  signals  from  the current 
settlement data discussed above. As expected from the impact of the 
norm  variables  and the lower sum of lagged  wage and price effects, the 
forecasts are  generally  lower in the Perry-type  equations. 
All of the forecast results are consistent with a continuing  decline in 
the union wage premium.  The 1988  narrowing  of 2 percentage  points is 
historically  atypical  and  hence  the  fact  that  all  equations  predict  a smaller 
rate  of closing is expected. Based on our reading  of the data  on contract 
settlements, we  believe the premium forecast from a hybrid-norm 
specification  provides  the best forecast, but  the differences  among  them 
are small. Using the forecasts of the hybrid  models, we project  that the 
premium  will close 2.9 percentage  points through 1991. (We place no 
reliance  on the projection  of an increase  in the premium  in 1992,  the last 
year of the forecast.) 
Conclusion 
Unions are traditionally  regarded  as the inflation  wild card. In this 
paper,  we have documented  that union  premiums  have undergone  long 
periods of year-to-year  increases followed by periods of year-to-year 
decreases. Prolonged  upswings  throughout  the 1950s  and from 1969  to 
1983 were followed by declines, first, from 1960 to  1969 and, most 
recently,  from 1983  to 1989. 
These global shifts in the direction  of the premium  exactly date the 
Perry norm shifts in aggregate  wage inflation  equations. Thus, wage 
inflation  was higher than expected during the 1970s and lower than 
expected  throughout  the 1960s  and  from 1983  through  the present.  Using 
our union and nonunion  wage series, we find  that Perry  norm  shifts are 
more prominant  in the union than in the nonunion sector. This is 
particularly  true in 1970  when the union sector had a large, statistically 
significant  norm uptick in wage growth, while nonunion  wage growth 
continued  along  its historical  path. 
For today's labor  market,  the central  historical  event is the doubling 
of the union  premium  from 1970  to 1983.  According  to one measure,  the 
premium  increased  from 17.6 percent in 1969  to 35.6 percent in 1985. 
Although  the premium  has declined since 1985, the decline is small in 
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The size of today's union premium  is central  to our conclusion that 
inflation  will not accelerate  after 1989  the way it did after 1969.  In 1969, 
after a decade of declining  premiums,  the premium  was close to series 
lows. In 1989,  even after several years of moderation,  it remains  close 
to series highs. This change in relative wages has combined  with other 
developments  to hamper  the competitive  position  of unionized  firms.  In 
particular,  both  international  trade  and  deregulation  have disproportion- 
ately affected  unionized  industries. 
The result  of these developments  is that the strength  of labor  unions 
has been seriously  eroded. Union employment  shares  in the key indus- 
trial sectors have declined sharply since 1973. There is an important 
nonunion  presence in almost  all of the traditional  union strongholds.  At 
the same  time, management  opposition  to unions, as reflected  in allega- 
tions of unfair  labor practices and petitions for union decertification, 
have increased  significantly  since the 1960s.  Unionized  firms  have also 
shown  a great  deal more aggressiveness  in using those features  of labor 
law that allow them to shift work out of the union sector or to hire 
permanent  replacements  for striking  workers. 
For  the short  term,  our specific  conclusion  is that  although  the rate  of 
compression  in the union  premium  will slow, the current  regime  of union 
wage restraint  will continue. In terms  of absolute  rates of wage change, 
current  settlements  are showing  an acceleration  in union  wages, but the 
acceleration  is slight and union wage growth should remain approxi- 
mately  0.5 to 1.0  percentage  point  below nonunion  wages. With  inflation 
at approximately  4.75 percent  and  unemployment  at 5.5 percent,  contin- 
ued modest acceleration  to 4 percent (union sector) or 5 percent (non- 
union  sector)  is the prediction  of equations  with constant  norms. 
Current  high  levels of capacity  utilization  have temporarily  weakened 
the pressure  on the union  sector. But, unless the premium  shrinks  much 
more than predicted  above, unionized firms  will remain  the high-cost 
producers  who lose market  share  over time. Hence, the  long-run  outlook 
for the union  sector is bleaker  than  is the short-run  outlook. 
Although  there is a tendency to "blame" unions for the increase in 
the premium  and  for the resulting  difficulties,  a good case can be made 
that  neither  unions  nor  management-for the inflationary  contracts  were 
voluntary  agreements of two parties-is  to blame. For commercial 
contracts  involving long-term  relationships,  the supply shocks of the 
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designed to handle the acceleration in inflation after 1970, and the 
methods  for adjusting  to new economic conditions were rudimentary. 
Although it has taken years, most of  these  long-term commercial 
contracts  have by now been reformed,  often through  lump-sum  awards 
that  also reset marginal  costs to competitive  levels. In the union sector, 
the high  premiums  suggest that union firms'  marginal  costs are still out 
of line. Hence the bleak  long-term  outlook.37 
37. See Wachter  (1986);  Joskow (1976). A leading case is Aluminum  Company  of 
America  v. Essex Group,  499 F.Supp. 53 (1980).  In that  case, an escalator  clause did not 
work  as intended,  significantly  understating  the cost increase  that  occurred. 